This article uses the concept of the peacekeeping economy to examine how peacekeepers -as individualsand peacekeeping -as a complex of institutions, policy and practice -interact with, and inevitably shape, the societies in which they operate. It focuses on how peacekeeping economies are gendered, and the implications of this gendering. The article first examines three types of work characteristic of the peacekeeping economies in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo -namely domestic service, sex work, and private security. The United Nation's (UN's) institutional responses to these sectors demonstrates the persistence of 'traditional' gendered ideologies in peacekeeping, in which the 'private', feminized sphere of the home -encompassing peacekeepers' domestic and sexual arrangements -is marginalized, while the masculinized realm of security is prioritized and closely regulated. Furthermore, factoring in peacekeepers' individual responses to service, sex, and security reveals a counter-narrative of the peacekeeper-as-vulnerable. This counter-narrative helps obscure the potential for exploitation of locals by peacekeepers. Yet it also upsets the subject position of both the peacekeeper and 'the local' in an unexpected manner, ultimately undermining the notion of the (masculine) UN protector. Such an understanding complicates popular notions of how gender 'works' in peacekeeping sites, and enables insights into the ramifications of peacekeeping's (often) self-imposed limitations.
Introduction
United Nations peacekeepers are deployed in conflict and post-conflict areas around the globe to 'restore security, stability, justice [and] human rights ' and '[help] people rebuild their lives'. 1 Yet UN peacekeepers also have lives to live. For the civilian, police and some military peacekeepers in a UN peacekeeping mission, this means that the mundane and the everyday -finding housing, a decent supermarket and a few reliable restaurants; paying bills; having a social life -feature in their lives no less than the more lofty tasks to which their working hours are dedicated. 2 For peacekeepers, the 'everyday' in most peacekeeping sites -that is, the routine undertakings of work, socializing and otherwise managing daily life -encompasses a style of living that, while not wholly unique to these environments, is of a particular sort. 3 Peacekeepers typically have a domestic staff; they live in guarded compounds; they move around in marked UN vehicles; their movements are restricted to certain zones and establishments; and they are alone -unaccompanied by partners, spouses or children. The majority are men. Many are single; others are 'single for the mission'. They are well paid. And they are mostly foreigners.
This article examines how peacekeepers -as individuals -and peacekeeping -as a complex of institutions, policy and practice -interact with, and inevitably shape, the societies in which they operate. Of central concern is how the everyday interaction between the local and the international in peacekeeping sites is gendered, and what this gendering reveals. To explore these interactions, I use the concept of the peacekeeping economy. Throughout, the peacekeeping economy concept is employed in two ways. The first is to describe and analyse a specific phenomenon and sets of relationships. The other, admittedly more contentious, is as a microcosm for the overall peacekeeping project. This has the corollary that observations pertaining to the peacekeeping economy give additional insight into the politics and practice of modern peacekeeping (Jennings, 2013) .
The article has two main components. In the first, I examine three types of work characteristic of the peacekeeping economies in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): domestic service, sex work, and private security. I particularly focus on how work in the three sectors is organized, and on the ways in which peacekeepers -individually and institutionallyrespond and relate to local domestic, sex and security workers. The article's second component comprises a closer reading of these individual and institutional responses. Specifically, I argue that the institutional approaches to service, sex, and security work in peacekeeping economies reflect the persistence of more 'traditional' gendered ideologies in peacekeeping, in which the 'private', feminized sphere of the home -encompassing peacekeepers' domestic and sexual arrangements -is marginalized, while the masculinized realm of security is prioritized and closely regulated. 4 Among individual peacekeepers, however, what is more striking is not the differences in attitudes towards the three sectors, but the overarching similarity of sentiment towards the local men and women working in them. Here the germane sentiment is distrust by the international towards the local purveyor: the local as unreliable 'trickster', a gendered (coded feminine) representation that is rooted in colonial and racial discourses. 5 Moreover, taken together, the institutional and individual attitudes reveal a counter-narrative of the peacekeeper as someone vulnerable to the whims, caprices and chaotic insecurity of 'the local': dependent on (certain) locals for services and security, but never able to trust the integrity, efficiency or good faith of the same. This counter-narrative of peacekeeper-as-vulnerable helps obscure -intentionally or otherwise -the potential for exploitation of locals by peacekeepers. Yet it also upsets the subject position of both the peacekeeper and the local in a somewhat unexpected way, in which the UN 'protector' is pacified. Yet this pacification -or feminization -of the peacekeeper does not produce a dichotomous 'masculinization' of the local. Instead, the peacekeeper and the local can be seen as embodying two archetypal feminine tropes: the victim at the mercy of the trickster. Such an understanding complicates popular notions of how gender 'works' in peacekeeping sites. It also enables insights on peacekeeping's (often) self-imposed limitations, and their ramifications.
The data for this project have been collected via multi-week fieldwork engagements (2011) (2012) in Monrovia, Liberia, and Goma and Kinshasa, DRC. Over 100 interviews with local residents and international actors involved in all aspects and levels of peacekeeping economies were conducted, along with focus groups and participant observation in sites and establishments typical of peacekeeping economies (including clubs, restaurants, bars, brothels, hotels, private security companies, property management companies and professional settings). 6
Peacekeeping economies and gender
Before I turn to the service-sex-security triad, a brief explanation of the peacekeeping economy and its gendered underpinnings is necessary. The peacekeeping economy concept has been explained in some detail elsewhere (Aning and Edu-Afful, 2013; Higate and Henry, 2004; Jennings, 2013; and Jennings and Nikolić-Ristanović, 2009 ). To summarize: the peacekeeping economy refers to economic activity that either would not occur, or would occur at a much lower scale and rate of pay, without the international presence, of which a UN peacekeeping mission is a central component. Specifically, it encompasses the jobs available to local staff in UN offices or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that accompany the UN presence (occasionally professional but usually administrative or unskilled, as well as subcontracted work such as maintenance and security); unskilled and mainly informal work that locals do for individual internationals (e.g. cleaning, gardening, other housework); jobs in the establishments that cater primarily to internationals; and participation in the sex industry. Within the host society, peacekeeping economies include skilled and unskilled workers; local and foreign (expatriate) businesspeople; political, economic and military elites; landlords; professionals and tradespeople; and people working in both the formal and the informal economies. Because peacekeeping economies refer to a totality of economic activity, it is necessary to include those whose livelihoods depend on the presence of a large cadre of international personnel but are not directly employed or (sub)contracted by any organization.
Use of the term 'peacekeeping economy' should not be seen as excluding peacebuilders or other international personnel employed outside the mission. The term simply refers to the massive transformation -social, economic, political, logistical and in terms of the scale of external resourcesthat gets under way in a host society once the UN Security Council mandates a peacekeeping operation, which in turn provides the security and (often) logistical support necessary for other international actors to establish or expand their presence. Finally, the terms 'UN personnel' or 'peacekeepers' are generally used to refer to all UN mission staff and personnel, whether civilian, military or police. 7 Peacekeeping economies are inescapably gendered from the outset. They privilege and most profitably reward those with the capital, connections, knowledge and presence needed to service international institutions and individuals in the immediate aftermath of war. These are often local or national politico-economic and military elites, diaspora returnees, local and expatriate businesspeople, as well as those active in wartime (often illicit) networks: predominantly men (Jennings, 2013) . The consuming side of the peacekeeping economy is also lopsidedly male. While some international institutions or NGOs may achieve something approaching parity in the sex balance of their international staff -and while globally international civilian peacekeepers are estimated to consist of approximately 30% women 8 -peacekeeping missions overall are largely staffed by men. 9 This in turn has an effect on the kinds of entertainment venues that flourish in peacekeeping economies.
Conversely, particularly the informal or illicit sectors encompassed by the peacekeeping economy comprise what is usually considered 'women's work', such as domestic work, hostessing and waitressing, and sex work. While these jobs are not exclusively the domain of women, women tend to dominate these sectors. Meanwhile, positions of power, ownership and influence in both the formal and the illicit sectors of these economies tend to be occupied by men. That said, some of the formal sector jobs encompassed by the peacekeeping economy, such as jobs in UN offices, see more equal distribution among women and men. Indeed, insofar as administrative jobs are also often considered as 'women's work', women may have the advantage in this area, while men are more likely to be employed as mechanical or maintenance staff. Some local sources in the three field sites also claim that women are favoured for the (very few) professional-level jobs available to locals in UN missions, but publicly available UN statistics do not break down the category of 'local civilian staff' by sex or occupation.
In short, peacekeeping economies, and women's and men's participation in them, are structured along highly gendered lines in a way that aligns closely with stereotypical or 'traditional' gender roles. 10 Furthermore, while peacekeeping economies are not necessarily harmful to either local individuals or the community as a whole -indeed, where a peace operation effectively distorts the local economy to create a peacekeeping economy, there may be increased opportunities for women's and men's participation in the formal or informal sectors -it is nevertheless the case that they do not affect everyone equally, benignly or beneficially. This is perhaps particularly evident in the case of local sex industries, which typically expand -often dramatically -with the advent of a peacekeeping operation. 11 But it also applies to people working in other sectors, especially those that are among the more 'invisible', such as domestic workers, as well as some working in male-dominated sectors, such as men employed in the lower levels of private security.
Service, sex, and security
The description above gives some basis for understanding the generalities of how peacekeeping economies are gendered. In this section, I attempt to provide some flesh to the bones by examining three important, primarily informal, sectors of the peacekeeping economies in Liberia and the DRC. 12 For each sector, I map out characteristics of how the work is organized and discuss international (UN institutional and individual peacekeeper) responses to each category of work, in order to construct a larger argument concerning the gendering of peacekeeping practice and the related, counterintuitive construction of the 'peacekeeper-as-vulnerable'.
Domestic service
For civilian peacekeepers, UN police and non-contingent military officers living privately, employing at least one domestic worker, is the norm. This worker is typically a woman whose duties involve cleaning, laundry/ironing, and occasionally food shopping or cooking, although peacekeepers living in houses may also employ a separate gardener/maintenance person (usually a man) or cook (usually a woman). The domestic service sector in peacekeeping economies shares some overarching characteristics with the transnational 'maid trade', which refers to the migration of women to work as domestic servants abroad (Chang and Ling, 2000; Chin, 1998; Pettman, 1996; True, 2012) . These women are often subjected to, or face the possibility of, violence or exploitation by their employers 'due to the highly unequal power relations at work based on the combined oppressions of gender, class, nationality, and ethnicity' (True, 2012: 57) . The situation in peacekeeping economies is not entirely analogous: here the peacekeepers are the foreigners, while the domestic workers are, if not local (they may have migrated to the peacekeeping site from their home area), usually nationals of the host country. Moreover, at least in urban areas, it is rare for peacekeepers to have live-in staff. Yet the possible disparities in terms of gender, class, nationality, ethnicity and race between the peacekeeper employer and the local employee are similarly evident. 13 Furthermore, the characteristic working conditions present in the maid trade -specifically, informal and effectively unregulated work that takes place in the 'private' sphere of the home, with few legal protections -largely prevail in the peacekeeping economies of Liberia and the DRC.
Peacekeepers that are new to a mission have various ways of procuring domestic staff. Occasionally, cleaners are employed by the property management company that runs the compound. In these cases, there is little direct contact between the worker and the peacekeeper: cleaners generally clean multiple apartments and do not take on other duties. This arrangement is seemingly the least common. More often, peacekeepers will go through their colleagues for help. Departing peacekeepers try to find new positions for their staff, and 'pass them on' to new arrivals. Another typical method is to ask national colleagues for help, in the expectation that they will put someone forward for the job.
In other words, in the absence of any formal vetting processes, connections and personal recommendations are the means through which peacekeepers find domestic workers. This process is hardly unusual: it is the way the domestic service industry functions in many countries. But it is notable in the heavily securitized peacekeeping environment, where regulations pertaining to peacekeepers' accommodation, freedom of movement and permitted forms of contact with locals are generally restrictive.
As noted earlier, a difference between the situation for most domestic workers in peacekeeping economies versus those that migrate abroad for work is that, among peacekeepers (in urban areas, at least), it is relatively uncommon to have live-in staff. Most peacekeepers live in one-bedroom apartments or share larger apartments or houses with other colleagues; peacekeeping missions being non-family accompanied, they do not bring with them spouses or children that require larger accommodation (and potentially higher staffing levels). The absence of peacekeepers' families in mission sites also means that a key element of domestic service elsewhere -namely, childcare -is not prevalent in peacekeeping economies. It is therefore not surprising that some peacekeeper sources claim to have never or rarely seen their domestic workers, at least since the hiring transaction. While the fruits of their labour are visible, the labourer her-or himself is not. This invisibility also extends to UN institutional attitudes, as will be seen later.
That said, peacekeeper sources described a range of relationships with their domestic staff, which, as previously mentioned, are mediated by differences in gender, race, class, education, nationality, and language. For example, some civilian peacekeepers from other African countries claimed that the way in which they related to their domestic staff was different from that of European/'Northern' peacekeepers, since (the African peacekeepers said) they were used to having domestic staff in their own countries, unlike many Europeans. The implication, sometimes explicitly stated and other times implicit, is that African peacekeepers are better attuned to how domestic workers should be treated. (That there is a difference between diverse groups of international employers was generally corroborated by domestic worker sources, although without unanimity as to whether it was experienced positively or negatively.) Nonetheless, it is difficult to generalize about how different groups of peacekeepers treat domestic workers, or about the workers' own experiences dealing with different internationals.
Regardless, a common thread through peacekeepers' accounts of their domestic staff was a lack of trust. Theft was a constant concern -one peacekeeper source described himself as 'very paranoid' about his staff -and the onus was on the peacekeeper to avoid tempting their cleaner by leaving out valuables. One informant said that it was important to pay good wages in order to avoid becoming a victim of theft; and indeed, peacekeeper sources often said that they paid their domestic staff more than locals did, while demanding less. This was also corroborated by various domestic worker sources, some of whom claimed that, as long as there were internationals needing staff, they would refuse to work for local families owing to the latter's lower pay and greater demands. However, while most peacekeepers compared themselves favourably to locals in terms of pay and conditions for domestic staff, they were almost uniformly resistant to paying more than their colleagues for domestic help. The one peacekeeper source who admitted to voluntarily paying her cleaner more than normal -she paid approximately double the rate paid by other mission sources -said that she no longer mentioned her staff arrangements after getting criticized by her colleagues for 'fucking up the market'. Conversely, several peacekeeper sources bragged about paying less than the going rate for their domestic workers. Other peacekeeper informants mentioned how they paid school fees or medical bills for their workers' children or extended families, usually in lieu of higher salaries. A common complaint was that domestic workers often requested extra money or 'loans' from the peacekeepers, which would never be paid back.
Cumulatively, most peacekeeper sources expressed the opinion that their domestic staff were lucky, given the conditions and pay that (the peacekeepers assumed) they could expect from local employers. Insofar as possible exploitation of domestic staff was ever considered -normally when prompted by my questions -it was deemed something that locals did to locals, rather than a problem in which internationals were implicated. At the same time, during fieldwork in both Liberia and the DRC, I heard from mission sources unsubstantiated rumours of peacekeepers demanding sex from (or otherwise having sexual relationships with) domestic workers, including children (houseboys and housegirls), 14 as well as testimony from domestic workers regarding abusive situations arising from international employers.
An interesting but -in the context of the general lack of regulation and 'invisibility' of domestic service -perhaps unsurprising aspect of domestic service in the peacekeeping economy is the UN's institutional neglect of the issue. Peacekeepers receive no official guidance from the mission regarding the hiring, paying, firing or otherwise fair treatment of their staff. According to peacekeeper sources, the topic did not feature in any of the initiation training they received when coming into the mission. Although a process was eventually started in the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to design model contracts that peacekeepers could use for staff -contracts with sixmonth terms, partly in order to avoid Liberian bureaucracy that would apply to longer terms of employment -in general there is little guidance for peacekeepers who want a more formal understanding with their employees, nor is there any institutional encouragement for peacekeepers to enter into such formalities. Indeed, as one peacekeeper source noted, contracts are best avoided because they can be used to 'entrap' and 'entangle' UN personnel. On a similar note, a source involved in the model contract process clarified that such contracts were first and foremost intended for the protection of the peacekeeper, rather than the local employee. The perceived need is to head off a wave of 'false allegations' (of unpaid wages or unfulfilled promises) lodged by former employees against outgoing personnel -especially as the mission draws to a close and domestic workers see that their future employment prospects working for internationals are dwindling, and thus feel they have nothing to lose.
In other words, from the UN standpoint, the risk of exploitation in the employer-employee relationship is borne mostly by the peacekeeper employer, rather than the local employee. This aligns with the view expressed by individual peacekeepers, who also typically presume that internationals victims rather than perpetrators of such problematic practices. In terms of domestic service, then, exploitative conduct is deemed primarily the domain of the locals.
Sex work
A significant aspect of peacekeeping economies -as observed in Liberia and the DRC, and as documented elsewhere 15 -seems to involve (at least the promise of) the sexual availability of local women and men for international actors: whether freely, for a contracted fee or for some form of in-kind payment(s). Evidence exists of survival prostitution and trafficking in peacekeeping sites Whitworth, 2004) . But the types of sexual transactions occurring in peacekeeping economies are more diverse than these extremes indicate; they include -but are not limited to -the stereotypical sex worker-client exchange, as well as longer-term, but essentially transactional, relationships between local and international partners that mimic those common in sex tourism sites (Jennings, 2008 (Jennings, , 2010 Simic, 2012) . In this section, I will for the sake of simplicity -and as a reflection of the dominant dynamic in peacekeeping sites -generally refer to sex workers as women and their clients as men, without denying that local men also service the sexual desires of international women, or that same-sex relationships or transactions occur.
A survey conducted by the Liberian National AIDS Control Program (cited in Jennings and Nikolić-Ristanović, 2009: 17) separated out three categories of women transacting sex in Liberia: prostitutes, hustlers and homegirls. Prostitutes are professional sex workers, usually working out of clubs, hotels or entertainment centres, and/or as escorts. They are depicted by the survey as having sex work as their main or only source of income, and as making a good living; they may also have a pimp or madam. In my discussions with professional sex workers in Monrovia, Goma and Kinshasa (many, but not all, of whom worked independently), they were forthright as to how they made their living and unsentimental in talking about their job. While not denying that they preferred regular customers, there was little professed anticipation that selling sex would lead to longer or exclusive relationships. Hustlers are more akin to survival sex workers: they sell sex when and as needed to get by, and may not identify as sex workers; they tend to work on the streets. Homegirls are out after relationships, whether with international men or with local 'sugar daddies'; they do not identify as sex workers but as girlfriends, and use transactional sex or transactional relationships to maintain or improve their standard of living. In these relationships, the material expectations of the boyfriend, and the desired availability and behaviour of the girlfriend, tend to be mutually understood.
While not capturing the full diversity of sexual transactions in peacekeeping sites, these categories are nevertheless useful in identifying pertinent differences in the experiences of many of the locals involved. 16 Another useful characterization is found in Hunter's (2002: 101) material from South Africa, in which he distinguishes between 'sex linked to subsistence' and 'sex linked to consumption' -while noting that 'sometimes consumption itself is seen as a prerequisite for subsistence' (Hunter, 2002: 112) .
The link between consumption and subsistence is indeed important, perhaps particularly among the professional sex workers and the homegirls/girlfriends. Among the professionals, it is fairly easy to distinguish between those whose target group is primarily internationals or local elitesfrom whom significantly higher rates can be charged, on a sliding scale, with 'European' (white) and other non-African internationals being charged most, and African internationals and high-end local customers charged less 17 -and those working the less profitable local market. The former tend to cultivate a 'high class' aesthetic, which comes with a significant outlay on dress and appearance. This is because most venues where internationals congregate will deny entry to local women who -looks-or behaviour-wise -are not deemed suitable to mix with international clientele. Gaining access to these venues also entails other costs, including transportation to and from the areas of the city where internationals socialize, cover charges, drinks (while waiting for customers) and, usually, gratuities to the bar staff or management.
Altogether, these outlays can amount to a hefty sum. While many of my sources said they prioritized putting some earnings aside as savings, and others managed to start small businesses (mostly market selling) on the side with their proceeds, all complained about the costs involved in maintaining their appearance and access to venues. As one sex worker source said, this work is 'Caesar paying Caesar'. Sex workers also complained that, while newly arrived internationals were willing to pay very high rates -$100, or occasionally up to $300 depending on locale (Monrovia and Kinshasa are most expensive) and the riskiness or kinkiness of the sex -the internationals that have been in-country longer become increasingly stingy. Homegirls/girlfriends seeking international boyfriends also face similar demands on their appearance and behaviour, and thus similar outlays. Among homegirls, these costs are usually expected to be borne (or at least subsidized) by the boyfriends, but can be difficult to sustain in the periods when the woman has no boyfriend. However, without such investments, homegirls will struggle to find boyfriends, while professional sex workers will likely be relegated to servicing the local market. This entails taking on a greater number of clients at substantially lower prices. The gist is that the professional sex workers who have access to the venues most patronized by internationals generally have greater means or connections than those working in venues oriented towards locals. Many also speak decent English, including in the DRC, where -despite the fact that the UN stabilization mission (MONUSCO) is a Francophone mission -a sizable minority of internationals speak little or no French.
According to the zero-tolerance policy against sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), which is contained in the UN Secretary-General's Bulletin of 2003 (ST/SGB/2003/13), UN personnel are not supposed to buy (or exchange goods or services for) sex when on mission, nor are they allowed to have sex with persons under the age of 18. Furthermore, the Secretary-General's Bulletin states that peacekeepers are strongly discouraged from having any sexual relationships with 'beneficiaries of assistance', which is generally read to refer to all local residents. This is based on the presumption that the power dynamic in peacekeeper-local relationships is inherently unequal, and thus that such relationships are essentially exploitative. They accordingly undermine the UN's credibility and integrity. Punishment for violations of the zero-tolerance policy include, for civilian peacekeepers, repatriation from the mission and blacklisting from further participation in UN peacekeeping; military peacekeepers are subject to punishment according to the rules of their home military.
SEA is seldom reported, however, and allegations are often difficult to prove. Many allegations are thus considered unsubstantiated, and peacekeepers accordingly go unsanctioned. Perhaps the most striking example of the flaccidity of the enforcement of the zero-tolerance policy is the strategic use by peacekeepers of their UN affiliation and privileges, in order to cheat sex workers. Such behaviour -exemplified by peacekeepers refusing to pay the sex worker the agreed price, then calling in UN security to kick them out when the sex worker protests -was cited by sex workers in two field sites. When asked why the peacekeepers called UN security (given that they are not supposed to be buying sex from sex workers), the response from the sex workers was that the UN always takes the side of the UN, even if the peacekeeper is at fault.
Yet while enforcement of the zero-tolerance policy is insufficient at best, there are robust attempts by the UN as an institution to normatively regulate against sexual contact between peacekeepers and locals. Building on the understanding of exploitation outlined in the SecretaryGeneral's Bulletin, some of these efforts resemble radical feminist (prohibitionist) positions against sex work. These are essentially well intentioned, although they wither under critical scrutiny: as Henry (2013: 132-133 ) argues, such attempts strip sex workers (and local citizens writ large) of agency, essentially trapping them into victim status, passive and incapable of consent or choice in their own lives.
A markedly different, yet also prevalent, tactic to normatively regulate international-local sex is the use of scare stories in mission initiation training (Jennings, 2008 (Jennings, , 2013 . These scare stories encompass a range of dangers to be feared in the local environment, including the risks of sexual contact with locals. Here the risk of sexually transmitted disease figures prominently, with peacekeeper sources telling of wildly inflated prevalence rates among the local population -information they said they received as part of their initiation training. Peacekeepers are also warned that buying sex makes them vulnerable to extortion or robbery once the sex worker is in their apartment, either by the sex worker her/himself or their pimp. The topic of SEA raises similar fears of extortion as a means of victimizing peacekeepers. The following purportedly true story is used to caution peacekeepers from stopping their cars for locals at night: A peacekeeper stopped to help two women who appeared to be in distress at the side of the road, and when he opened the door they jumped in and threatened to report him for SEA violations unless he paid them money. 19 Notable here is that the peacekeeper is entirely innocent of anything other than concern for his fellow human; this concern lands him in trouble, as it opens him up to being falsely reported against, and thus taken advantage of. Such scare stories work in close conjunction with stringent, security-justified restrictions imposed on peacekeepers' movements. One peacekeeper source said that the training they received, along with the various security restrictions they are coached on, make 'you a different species, [you] always think, "hey, I'm a foreigner here, I need to be careful"'. Another said that the (perceived) dangers of mission life are drilled into them in the initiation training, which makes them 'careful about interacting with people'; moreover, the training they receive is 'not always conducive to a good living environment'. Thus, there is an institutionally endorsed and disseminated view of locals as sources of threat to peacekeepers, which encompasses, but is not limited to, the dangers to peacekeepers of engaging in sexual contact with locals.
The dual nature of the UN's institutional approach to peacekeeper sex with locals -in which locals are alternately to be feared (as taking advantage of, and possibly physically infecting, peacekeepers) and pitied (as exploited victims incapable of agency) -is echoed in the reactions of individual peacekeepers themselves. Many peacekeepers, both women and men, tended to have highly sexualized views of local women, to the extent that, as Higate and Henry (2004: 491) have also found, 'some local women were constructed as sexual predators'. Local women -especially (but not only) female sex workers -are believed to be highly aggressive in their dealings with (or solicitation of) internationals, thus leading many peacekeepers to consider sex work in mission areas as a 'victimless crime' (Jennings, 2008) . This construction simultaneously situates the peacekeeper as prey, at the same time as it absolves peacekeepers of responsibility for their own side of the transaction because of the extreme eagerness of the local partner. Moreover, the obvious preference of sex workers for international clientele is not necessarily understood by peacekeepers as a function of the higher rates that internationals pay, but is often instead expressed as reflecting substantive differences in the nature of the experience. A typical explanation that peacekeepers give is that internationals treat sex workers better (i.e. in a less degrading fashion) than local sex buyers.
This ascription of sexual agency, including of a predatory nature, to local women clearly stands in contrast to another representative view of women (especially women sex workers) in conflict and post-conflict sites as passive and coerced victims (see e.g. Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf, 2002 ). Yet there was also space for the latter response among peacekeepers towards sex workers. For example, while many peacekeepers are not bothered by 'normal' instances of colleagues buying sex, the same respondents almost uniformly volunteered that they would report to mission authorities activity that they considered to cross some kind of ethical boundary, such as sex with young minors (under the age of 14) or instances of sexual abuse or assault (Jennings, 2008: 23-24) . In such cases, the woman or girl involved is granted victim status and becomes an object of pity. Even in less extreme cases, peacekeeper sources would sometimes talk of sex workers as women with tough lives doing what they need to do to survive, and lament the difficult circumstances that led so many women to sell sex. A minority also spoke disparagingly of colleagues who would take advantage of such women.
Both the institutional and the individual responses to international-local sex -while being somewhat internally incoherent -are more developed than those towards domestic service, concerns about which are rarely voiced. Yet there is an overarching similarity. While the responses to peacekeeper-local sex allow for the possibility of locals being exploited by peacekeeperssomething that is generally absent from the discourse around domestic service -there remains a strong focus on the peacekeeper as potential victim. Moreover, while the peacekeepers are warned to protect themselves against getting robbed, extorted, infected or worse by sex workers (or their pimps), there is little serious discussion of the possibility that peacekeepers themselves may pose a similar threat to sex workers, beyond the general statement that peacekeepers who buy sex are engaging in exploitation.
Private security
Private security is a growth industry in peacekeeping economies: as one Liberian private security guard confided, everyone works security because there are 'no jobs, proper jobs'. 20 Private security companies (PSCs) are retained by international institutions (including UN missions, agencies and programmes), NGOs, businesses and individuals to provide installation of security, of which round-the-clock guarding is the most important feature. At the ownership, management and guard levels, the private security industry is dominated by men; in Monrovia, Goma and Kinshasa, the more lucrative players in the industry are also often controlled by expatriates and/or are subsidiaries of international companies. Where guards are hired through companies (as opposed to being hired directly by the concerned individuals, a practice the UN discourages), customers are not supposed to give money, food or any other payment directly to the guard.
Security guards working for PSCs -including those working for companies that are contracted to provide security for UN installations -tend to work long hours under strict conditions with poor pay. While some companies operate three shifts of eight hours, 12-hour shifts are also common, and guards often work seven days a week with only one or two days off per month. 21 Security guards are not guaranteed meal or toilet breaks: indeed, for individual residences, the provision of toilet facilities for the guards is at the discretion of the customer. Guards are generally instructed to have limited contact with people in the installations they are guarding; if customers have a problem with the guards, they are encouraged to inform the company rather than deal directly with the individual. The average monthly pay for guards in each site is approximately $100 per month, which is middling pay in Monrovia and Goma and low by Kinshasa standards. Many guards work without contract; again, this includes guards working for companies that contract with the UN, which, according to regulations pertaining to subcontractors, are supposed to provide contracts for all of their staff. In other words, there is not necessarily that much difference between the -seemingly formalized -private security industry and the service or sex industries in terms of the prevalence of informal labour, at least among the lowest waged. These conditions are tolerated by the workers largely because there is a surplus of potential guards. Private security is one of the few fields in which low-level ex-combatants can be seen to have a comparative advantage.
While UN peacekeeping missions are typically thought of as a purveyor of security, they are also both a consumer and, to a more limited extent, regulator of private security in mission areas. As noted above, the UN hires PSCs to provide static security at (non-military) mission installations, supplementary to its own security staff. The mission's internal security department also vets PSCs operating in mission sites, creating an approved list of vendors for UN personnel's home use. This is effectively an institutional endorsement of particular companies. Importantly, the issue of whether to employ private security is not at the discretion of the UN employee: all UN employees must live in guarded residences. UN personnel that use guards from companies approved by the UN are eligible to get security expenses reimbursed, whereas hiring guards privately, or using guards from companies not on the list, does not qualify for reimbursement. In this way, the UN exerts effective regulatory control on the local private security market, especially insofar as other international institutions or NGOs use the UN's vendors lists for their own security provision. Finally, as noted above, UN missions strongly emphasize security issues and dangers to staff, particularly via the initiation training and the specialized security training that incoming mission personnel are supposed to complete. The scenarios repeated in these training sessions typically emphasize the danger and unpredictability posed by the local environment and local people, thus reinforcing among personnel the importance and appropriateness of the missions' many security restrictions.
Individual peacekeepers are certainly influenced by the institutional importance placed on security, and tend to stay within the compact, mission-delineated security perimeter zone and adhere to other security-justified regulations. On the topic of their relationship to the security guards at their residences, however, peacekeepers tended to express a lack of trust and occasionally unease. While peacekeepers uniformly accepted the premise that 24-hour guards were necessary, many expressed doubts as to their trustworthiness and effectiveness, and some expressed fears of guards cooperating with criminals in order to facilitate break-ins ('inside jobs'). Such concerns are similar to those expressed by peacekeepers about their domestic workers. There is nevertheless a difference between domestic and security staff: peacekeepers are generally not involved in the selection of their guards, beyond the decision to hire a particular PSC as security provider (or to live in a compound guarded by a specific company). The PSC thus performs the interlocutory and guarantor role that personal connections serve in relation to domestic workers. Unlike with domestic staff, there are few personal connections, or even personal contact, linking peacekeepers with security guards.
An interesting aspect of the security issue is the disjunction in attitudes towards 'security' in the abstract, on the one hand, and towards embodied security -that is, the security being enacted and provided by private security guards -on the other. 'Security' in the abstract is used by missions as a rationale for restrictions on and regulations for their staff, which are generally accepted by individual peacekeepers. Conversely, the embodied figure of the private security guard tends to invoke suspicion or scepticism among individual peacekeepers -if they are even noticed at all. Thus, the person of the security guard occupies much the same status as the domestic or sex worker, even while the work they do is, by virtue of the institutional endorsement of private security, deemed both necessary and important. Security may be described and enacted mostly by men, but the person of the security guard is feminized. This contention will be elaborated upon in the remaining two sections.
Gendered ideologies and the marginalization of the private
The triad of service, sex, and security, and UN institutional and individual responses to them, reveals interesting insights into how the peacekeeping economy -and, by extension, the peacekeeping project -is gendered. This is not because the way these sectors are structured in peacekeeping environments is entirely unique. There are certain similarities between the situation of domestic workers in peacekeeping sites and the global 'maid trade'; there are also parallels between the organization and characteristics of sex work in peacekeeping economies and in areas with developed sex tourism industries. Similarly, the exploitation of those working in the lower levels of the private security industry is hardly exceptional to peacekeeping sites (Stillman, 2011) . What makes the link to peacekeeping policy and practice is the way that peacekeeping institutions, and peacekeepers themselves, participate in and respond to these industries, and to the people that populate them.
A common thread linking service, sex, and security in peacekeeping economies is exploitation and violence, or the potential for exploitation and violence, of or against the women and men working in these industries. This is true for the private security industry as well as for the domestic service and sex industries. Low and inconsistent pay, long hours, lack of legal protection, lack of contract, physical insecurity and emotional vulnerability are among the dangers of work in these industries, although probably to differing extents and intensities.
Yet the ways in which missions relate to these three sectors is dramatically different. On the domestic service side there is institutional neglect. Insofar as any attention has been paid to the issue, the priority has been protecting the peacekeeper, not the worker. Regarding the sex industry (and sexual relations between internationals and locals in general), missions have adhered to -if not done a particularly good job in enforcing -a system-wide approach that is essentially prohibitionist. At the same time, the message communicated by missions to peacekeepers is that sex with locals is an inherently dangerous proposition that should be avoided, and there is clearly an institutional preference for peacekeepers to avoid close entanglements with local residents. Again, this is less for the benefit of local people -contra the principles expressed by the zero-tolerance policy -and more for the safety of the peacekeeper and, additionally, the safeguarding of the mission's reputation. Finally, on the security front, the mission is most active both as a user, as an informal regulator and as an endorser of particular private security providers. Moreover, the necessity for intrusive, and arguably excessive, security regulations is continually institutionally reinforced through trainings, checks, and the use of scare stories and scenarios.
What accounts for these different institutional approaches? First, the elevation of the abstract notion of 'security' to an inviolable rationale -if always an elusive ideal -remains a dominant tendency in peacekeeping. 'Security' itself tends to be understood and enacted in a militarized and masculinist way. 22 Added to this, I argue, is the lingering perception within UN missions that domestic service and sex work are merely 'private' or 'personal' matters, akin to the way in which women's unpaid productive and reproductive labour has long been (and still is) invisible or deemed unfit for regulation or compensation (Peterson, 2003) . Although the Secretary-General's Bulletin and other attempts to regulate against sexual exploitation and abuse seemingly belie the contention that buying sex is a personal issue for peacekeepers, the lacklustre enforcement of these regulations points to the persistence of this framing.
Thus, the disparity in institutional responses to service, sex, and security in peacekeeping economies 'is a gendered process inseparable from the devaluation of a broad range of jobs associated with "women's work"' (True, 2012: 57) . 23 Domestic service is invisible; sex work is alternately pathologized or demonized. Conversely, the valorization of security, and the attendant organization of the private security sector -which entails that peacekeepers deal with institutionally endorsed companies rather than individuals, and ensures that interaction between the representative of the local (guard) and the international (peacekeeper) is minimized or controlled through the mediating force of the company -mitigates against such devaluing moves. However, the same gendered move that legitimates and prioritizes security also obscures the hardships and exploitation of the men tasked with providing it, who can be exploited in ways similar to those experienced by women working in domestic service and sex industries.
Turning to individual peacekeepers' attitudes towards service, sex and security, one finds another common thread. This is the lack of trust existing between the peacekeeper international and the local purveyor. This lack of trust is to some extent mutual, but expressed more consistently and forcefully on the international side, and often coupled with the sentiment that the local in question should be grateful for being employed by an international (as opposed to another local). Here there is also a gendered dynamic: a parallel between these representations of the local as untrustworthy and insufficiently grateful, and gendered stereotypes of women as unfaithful, double dealing, manipulative and basely opportunistic (see e.g. Eriksson Baaz and Stern, 2009: 507-508 ). This is not to imply that peacekeepers are misogynistic in their attitudes toward, and treatment of, local people. It is, however, to argue that certain attributes that recur when peacekeepers discuss their impressions of, and relationships with, local men and women are also among those that are (misogynistically) coded 'feminine'. This particular way of feminizing the local can be seen as an extension of archetypal colonial/racial discourses that feature the local as the unruly, unreliable 'trickster' (see also Whitworth, 2004: 27) , where the peacekeepers -including those from the global South -occupy the position of the colonial, even if they are not vested with the same degree of coercion and control. 24 Cumulatively, the institutional approach to the peacekeeping economy reflects a familiar gendering, in which the masculine (security) is elevated and the 'private' or feminine (sex work, domestic work) is deemed marginal or -where regulations exist -peculiarly elusive to dedicated enforcement. Individual attitudes are not divorced from institutional approaches; here, too, many are of the opinion that a peacekeeper's domestic and sexual arrangements are their own business, while security is properly a matter of institutional interest and regulation. But individual responses to service, sex, and security workers in peacekeeping economies also allow the articulation of ambivalence towards, if not outright distrust of, the local person. Such a reading reveals that it is not just the 'private' or 'invisible' that is gendered feminine in peacekeeping, but also the local person her-or himself -where the feminine tropes being ascribed are those of the 'woman as trickster', characterized by opportunism, manipulation and duplicity.
Conclusion: The peacekeeper as vulnerable
Finally, a striking commonality between the institutional and individual attitudes towards the peacekeeping economy and the local is the perception of the peacekeeper as a potential victim of exploitation, crime or violence. While peacekeepers are typically framed as always powerful and dominant vis-a-vis the local, this analysis reveals a counter-narrative, in which the internationals' superiority in resources and exit potential is countered by locals' superior connections, knowledge of the 'rules of the game', or opportunism and willingness to exploit whatever advantages they can find.
In the daily interactions occurring in peacekeeping settings -encapsulated here as service, sex and security -the advantages of the local are often experienced by peacekeepers as sources of threat and vulnerability. Here it is not always (or only) physical violence that peacekeepers fear, but also being taken advantage of, cheated, robbed, or otherwise exploited and humiliated. These fears are evident through the stories many peacekeepers tell about their encounters with the local, and in the way they talk about, and to, local people. 25 This counter-narrative differs from the standard representation of peacekeeping as dangerous work, where the danger is presented as coming from remnants of armed groups in an unstable post-conflict society. Instead, the counter-narrative emphasizes the diffuse and unspecified danger posed by 'the local' (people, 'culture', norms, society) itself. It is rarely articulated explicitly, but commonly circulates within peacekeeping institutions and among peacekeepers themselves. Yet it reinforces an overly simplistic (self-)representation of peacekeeping as a necessarily benign, well-intentioned and well-ordered exercise in an otherwise chaotic and violent society. It creates a white hat/black hat dichotomy in which any efforts made by locals to circumvent, thwart, adapt or take personal advantage of the peacekeeping presence are deemed essentially malign (see also Richmond, 2011: 97) . It also has the effect, intentionally or not, of obscuring the potential for exploitation of locals by peacekeepers.
Interestingly, however, further scrutiny reveals that this counter-narrative upsets the subject position of both the peacekeeper and the local in an unexpected and -for peacekeepers and peacekeeping institutions -potentially uncomfortable way. To understand how this occurs, we must return to the argument on the feminization of the local. I argue earlier that the local is feminized in a way that accords with archetypal misogynistic stereotypes of women as tricksters: untrustworthy and double dealing. Yet this is not what is generally understood by the notion of the 'feminized local' in peacekeeping sites. Instead, the standard narrative of the peacekeeper as protector (coded masculine) and the local as needing protection (coded feminine) evokes the feminized local as an object of pity and passivity. 26 The gendering of the counter-narrative is not so dichotomous. Here the peacekeeper is the one in need of protection, and thus feminized in a way associated with victimization and passivity, while the ordinary local embodies starkly different feminized stereotypes. While this echoes the Madonna/whore dichotomy that is often attached to (representations of) women (see e.g. Elshtain, 1995; Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007) -where here the peacekeeper is the innocent Madonna and the local is the sullied whore -there are important differences. First, while the body of the local is often highly sexualized, the feminization of the local that I describe is not only, or exclusively, sexual in nature, as is typically the case in the depiction of the whore. Second, while the Madonna/whore dichotomy tends to be imposed only on women, the feminization of both the local and the peacekeeper in this case concerns both male and female bodies.
Peacekeepers do not typically think of themselves as passive, or as victims. Yet the way that peacekeepers, including uniformed peacekeepers, live and work -bunkered, segregated, in a constant state of heightened alert -implies not just vulnerability, but inertia in the face of dispersed and untamed, or untameable, menace. Thus, while the counter-narrative enables a certain valorization of the peacekeeper at the expense of the local, it simultaneously undermines the notion of the (masculine) UN protector that is part of both peacekeeping mandates and mythos. It is also arguably more reflective of how modern peacekeeping is actually done.
This passivity and distrust is not lost on many locals, especially, but not only, those directly implicated in the peacekeeping economy. Moreover, in Eastern Congo in particular -which has experienced serious, if not continuous, outbreaks of armed violence and associated humanitarian emergencies over the entirety of the UN's presence -many locals felt betrayed by peacekeepers' perceived unwillingness or inability to live up to the 'masculine protector' role. Yet it is not just in Goma that the cosseted existence of peacekeepers was resented. Rather, this way of living and working fuels cynicism among local citizens about what peacekeepers are 'actually' doing there: many local sources in all three sites speculated that the peacekeepers stayed primarily to enrich themselves, with Congolese sources particularly suspicious of the UN's activity in resource-rich, mining-intensive Eastern Congo. Many peacekeepers themselves are cognizant of the limitations inherent in how they live and work. As one Goma-based peacekeeper confided, peacekeepers 'live in' Congo but do not 'live Congo', a distinction that prevents them from understanding the country's problems and leaves them unable to provide solutions.
Can peacekeeping be done differently? The implication of analysing the institutional reaction to various sectors of the peacekeeping economy -and the imbrication of the institutional and the individual -is that it can. Institutions change and are changed; individuals within these institutions pick up on these changes and react accordingly. Greater institutional awareness of the impact that peacekeepers' everyday lives and interactions have on local citizens and communities, and the gendered nature and implications of these interactions, would be a start. Missions can recognize the inevitability of peacekeeping economies, at the same time as they try to minimize their negative impact -for example, by establishing and enforcing fair labour standards for subcontractors and individual peacekeeper-employers to follow. Reconsideration of the often chauvinistic, gendered messages about locals that are institutionally endorsed and disseminated through training and security regimes is also an obvious step. Yet insofar as missions fail to relate to the everyday realities of peacekeepers -or do so only to scare and discipline -more locally sensitive forms of peacekeeping are unlikely to emerge. Finally, peacekeeping practitioners and policymakers need to pay more attention to the question of whom peacekeeping is for -acknowledging in doing so that peacekeepers themselves are also beneficiaries. Only by grappling with these issues in a concerted way can a more equitable balance be achieved between peacekeepers' and locals' sometimes contradictory claims on the UN.
